Beta golf harvard case

Earned Second Place Overall of Teams Worldwide, Top Undergraduate Team, Top Team in North America at the largest Investment Banking. "Beta Golf." Harvard Business School CaseMarch (Revised December ) View Details. Sahlman, William A., and Taslim Pirmohamed. "Athleta. Due to the constraints of the business environment, random assignment of participants to the technological or traditional sales groups was. He also learns the surprising pleasures of accounting, the beta golf harvard case of “beta,” the ingenious chicanery of leveraging, and innumerable other hidden workings of.

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Our results from a factorial MANCOVA analysis showed that incorporating launch monitors into the sales process significantly increased consumer learning, shopping experience, and expenditure amount. These findings enhanced the understanding of consumer perception toward technology-enabled sales and provided practical implications for golf equipment retailers considering the use of this technology.

The golf industry has been impacted by various technologies over the years. In the early 21st century, the design and manufacturing of high-performance equipment, such as titanium drivers, significantly impacted golf performance and equipment sales Farrally et al. One such measurement technology is the launch monitor, which measures golf ball and club movement and converts the information into interpretable numerical data such as ball speed, club speed, and attack angle Leach et al.

In addition to enhancing golf performance, launch monitors have allowed golf equipment retailers to offer personalized performance analyses for each consumer. Compared to the traditional approach, this new approach allows salespeople to utilize the data and insights provided by launch monitors to make equipment recommendations to consumers. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of launch monitor technology on golf equipment sales.

This research gap presents a perceived problem for many golf shops, given the substantial costs involved in acquiring, operating, and maintaining launch monitors Leach et al. Additionally, there are long-term costs associated with hiring salespeople equipped with the requisite knowledge in golf, human kinetics, and data analytics to proficiently operate launch monitors.

Therefore, it is important for golf industry professionals to determine whether launch monitor technology is a worthwhile investment that effectively promotes golf equipment sales and creates value for consumers. Unfortunately, academic studies addressing this question are scarce. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of launch monitor technology on golf consumer purchasing behavior.

In light of the growing population of women golfers, which exceeded six million in , this research also aligns with the recommendations made by the PGA to engage and understand this specific demographic NGF , ; PGA , Typically, women have different physical attributes than men, prompting manufacturers to design specific golf equipment lines for women Berner , However, this differentiation may inadvertently lead sales associates to make gender-based assumptions, potentially recommending unsuitable gear for women and diminishing their enjoyment of the game.

In contrast, launch monitors provide objective data to guide personalized equipment choices irrespective of gender biases. This advantage underscores the importance of exploring how women view a sales approach anchored by such technology. Wood et al. To tackle these research questions, we conducted a 2 sales approach: technology-enabled vs.

The ensuing conceptual framework section documents the rationale behind the three hypotheses we tested in this study. An explanation of the quasi-experimental design and results are then provided followed by a discussion of managerial implications. Previous empirical research has predominantly examined the celebrity endorsement effect from a macro perspective.

For example, an endorser like Tiger Woods can persuade consumers to switch brands, leading to a substantial increase in product demand, as evidenced by secondary data analysis Chung et al. Addressing this gap in the literature, this study adopts a micro perspective, exploring the use of in-store technology to enhance equipment sales and consumer experience at an individual level.

In the digital age, retail stores are proactively adopting innovative technologies like self-checkout, augmented reality AR , and virtual reality VR to meet the rising expectations of consumers Grewal et al. Beta golf harvard case Nevertheless, the mere introduction of technology in a store might be insufficient to impress busy consumers on its own.

As proposed by Grewal et al. Convenience is an essential aspect of modern technology that streamlines the purchase and usage of products and services Berry et al. In-store technologies provide five unique dimensions of convenience: decision, access, transaction, benefit, and post-benefit Grewal et al. Golf monitor technology notably impacts two of these: decision and benefit convenience.

Decision convenience enhances the ease of making purchase decisions. Technologies like VR, which allow consumers to explore and experience products in various contexts, exemplify this dimension Heller et al. Launch monitor technology similarly increases decision convenience by allowing consumers to test and evaluate different equipment inside the store. Using a mobile phone to scan quick response QR codes for detailed product information improves benefit convenience.

Similarly, launch monitor technology enhances benefit convenience by providing detailed performance data to help consumers visualize the outcome and benefits of using certain golf equipment. Apart from convenience, social presence is crucial for enhancing consumer experience and achieving desirable outcomes Grewal et al.

Social presence can be induced through i engagements with the device itself e. We argue that launch monitor technology promotes social presence through the first two means. First, it allows consumers to interact with the machine itself to view and analyze their performance, creating a sense of interacting with a knowledgeable golf expert Leach et al.

Second, the in-store use of launch monitor technology necessitates a salesperson to guide the process, provide feedback and suggestions, and even share their own passion for golf. These verbal and body interactions may facilitate human connections and foster a sense of community.

Consequently, the combined interaction with both the machine and salespeople can enhance social presence during the use of launch monitors. Drawing on the preceding discussion, launch monitor technology exemplifies an in-store technology that offers high convenience and social presence.

Such technologies have the potential to draw consumers, promote engagement, and ultimately produce more favorable outcomes than scenarios lacking these technologies Grewal et al. To test whether the technological sales approach using launch monitors can achieve desirable outcomes for golf shops, this study uses the Foote, Cone, and Belding FCB Model as a guiding framework to select measurable outcomes.

The FCB model is a significant contribution to advertising and retailing research, suggesting that consumers navigate cognitive, affective, and behavioral stages when making purchase decisions Vaughn , These stages often interact with one another and are integral parts of the shopping process.

Consequently, we hypothesize that:. Additionally, as women become an increasingly influential demographic in the golf industry, it is essential for researchers to better understand their specific needs and preferences as consumers NGF , ; L. These potential gender-based differences are important for golf retailers seeking to cater to a diverse consumer base and foster an inclusive environment L.

A deep understanding of how launch monitor technology impacts male and female golf consumers can guide effective marketing strategies. For instance, if responses to this technology vary by gender, additional qualitative research should explore the reasons behind these differences and retailers may need to tailor their sales approaches accordingly. Therefore, it is not just academically interesting, but also business-critical, to investigate whether men and women perceive the use of launch monitor technology differently in the sales process.

Based on these considerations, we hypothesize that:. This quasi-experimental study has six consumer background variables that could not be controlled through sample randomization. Instead, we will control for these potential confounding variables through statistical analyses. Golfer Age. Golf is a sport that appeals to all ages Sorbie et al.

As of , the age group was the largest consumer segment with 6. This study identifies the age of golfers as a potential confounding variable, in line with current golf industry research conducted by organizations such as the NGF. Consumer Expertise. Johnson and Russo suggested that familiarity with a product category can lead to three forms of consumer expertise: superior knowledge of available alternatives, superior ability to process new information, and superior ability to distinguish relevant and irrelevant information.

The Salesperson. Due to the constraints of the business environment, random assignment of participants to the technological or traditional sales groups was impractical. To address this issue, six covariates were statistically controlled: consumer age, golf experience, golf ability skill level , perceived salesperson attributes, familiarity with golf equipment, and familiarity with launch monitor technology.

This is a common practice in quasi-experimental studies when it is not possible to physically control confounding variables Shpitser et al. By controlling for these covariates, we were able to estimate the causal effects of the treatments more accurately and make causal inferences. This study was conducted at a retail golf shop in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, and involved consumers who were at least 18 years old and willing to participate on a voluntary basis.

The target population for the study was frequent and avid golfers, as opposed to beginner or novice players. A total of participants were included in the sample, which was collected over a period of seven days. Data for this study was collected via a survey instrument that was adapted from a review of relevant literature. The first section of the questionnaire collected socio-demographic information including gender, ethnicity, household income, USGA golf handicap, golf experience, and age, using multiple-choice format.

The questions and answer choices were designed based on the previous research of Braunstein and Zhang , Cianfrone and Zhang , and NGF The study utilized ten items adapted from Kent and Allen to measure covariates like familiarity with golf equipment and launch monitor technology.

Perceived salesperson attributes were assessed using a six-item scale adapted from Darley et al. All items used a 7-point Likert scale with anchor adjectives illustrating the concept. Consumer learning was gauged using five items adapted from Cianfrone et al. The shopping experience was measured using five items adapted from Bagdare and Jain and Pine and Gilmore , while satisfaction was evaluated via five items derived from Angelova and Zekiri and Hansemark and Albinsson Behavioral intention was assessed using five questions from Cronin et al.

All items utilized a 7-point Likert scale with anchor adjectives illustrating the concept. The last measure was actual purchasing behavior, with consumers reporting their total purchase amount, if any. In addition to using the literature as the primary guideline to assess the content validity, the formulated questionnaire was submitted to a panel of three experts with expertise in sport marketing research and practice.

The panel members reviewed each item in the questionnaire for relevance, representativeness, and clarity in the context of the specified concept. They provided suggestions for minor wording improvements and approved all items with respect to the three aspects of content validity. Pga top picks this week A pilot study involving 30 golfers at a local driving range was conducted to evaluate our questionnaire and familiarize ourselves with the quasi-experimental procedures.

Participants were eligible if they had purchased golf equipment in the past two years. After consenting, they were asked to reflect on their recent golf retail experience and complete the questionnaire. To examine the content validity of the measures, open-ended questions were included after each concept e.

Using SPSS Version 26, item-total correlation coefficients were calculated for each item within a concept, all exceeding the. This exceeded the recommended cut-off criterion of. Based on these results, minor improvements were made to the wording of a few items to enhance their clarity. Overall, the pilot study demonstrated that our questionnaire and procedures were appropriate for the proposed quasi-experimental study.

The study was conducted at this shop, which has approximately 13, square feet of retail space and two Trackman 4 equipped hitting bays. Customers were invited to participate in a brief questionnaire upon entry, with data collected over a span of seven days from most of the customers. Participants were requested to complete a two-part questionnaire; the first part prior to their shopping experience and the second part afterwards.

The first half contained 16 questions related to socio-demographic information and familiarity with golf equipment and launch monitor technology. The second half, completed post-shopping, consisted of 27 questions across six constructs: consumer learning, shopping experience, salesperson attributes, consumer satisfaction, intention to buy or recommend, and actual purchase amount.

A total of participants completed the item questionnaire covering nine factors. As the study was conducted during the COVID pandemic, measures were taken to follow social distance regulations and ensure participant safety. All data was collected outside the entrance to the store at a table set up in an open location.

No more than two participants were allowed to complete the questionnaire simultaneously, and each questionnaire was presented on a clipboard with a new, single-use pencil. Clipboards were disinfected after each use. Descriptive statistics were calculated for all socio-demographic, covariant, and dependent variables across both quasi-experimental groups i.

Despite preliminary construct validity checks during the pilot study, we further examined the unidimensionality of each concept. To do so, we conducted a factor analysis with principal component extraction and varimax rotation for items within each concept Williams et al. We followed the guideline of using an eigenvalue equal to or greater than 1.

Items were retained if they had a factor loading of. Finally, using the factor scores, we conducted a 2x2 factorial MANCOVA to examine differences in mean vector scores of consumer learning, shopping experience, consumer satisfaction, purchase intention, and actual expenditure amount between the technological and traditional sales group and between genders, while controlling for the identified covariates.

A total of shoppers voluntarily participated in the study, with Most of the participants The sample was predominantly composed of avid golfers, as Most of the dependent variables e. Every covariate and dependent variable had KMO values above the recommended threshold of. Using an eigenvalue threshold of 1.

As a single factor was extracted, a rotation was not needed, and the scree plot Cattell , confirmed unidimensionality. Current Stock:. Quantity: Want to buy more than 1 copy. Beta golf harvard case Buying for your team. See quantity pricing. This is a copyrighted PDF. Add copies before sharing with your team. Product : Pages: Related Topics: Incubators , Entrepreneurial financing , Entrepreneurial business strategy ,.

Summaries and excerpts of the latest books, special offers, and more from Harvard Business Review Press. Sign up. This Product Also Appears In. To start, these programs are overinclusive, providing the same admissions bump to a wealthy black applicant given every advantage in life as to a black applicant from a poor family with seemingly insurmountable barriers to overcome.

In doing so, the programs may wind up helping the most well-off members of minority races without meaningfully assisting those who struggle with real hardship. And, even purportedly benign race-based discrimination has secondary effects on members of other races.

Courts are not suited to the impossible task of determining which racially discriminatory programs are helping which members of which races—and whether those benefits outweigh the burdens thrust onto other racial groups. Ante , at Yet, Asian Americans can hardly be described as the beneficiaries of historical racial advantages.

Indeed, this Court even sanctioned this segregation—in the context of schools, no less. In Gong Lum v. Rice , U. See Exec. Order No. Over , were removed to camps beginning in , and the last camp that held Japanese Americans did not close until In the interim, this Court endorsed the practice. Korematsu v. Given the history of discrimination against Asian Americans, especially their history with segregated schools, it seems particularly incongruous to suggest that a past history of segregationist policies toward blacks should be remedied at the expense of Asian American college applicants.

IV Far from advancing the cause of improved race relations in our Nation, affirmative action highlights our racial differences with pernicious effect. In fact, recent history reveals a disturbing pattern: Affirmative action policies appear to have prolonged the asserted need for racial discrimination. Parties and amici in these cases report that, in the nearly 50 years since Bakke , U.

See ante , at 21— Rather, the legacy of Grutter appears to be ever increasing and strident demands for yet more racially oriented solutions. A It has become clear that sorting by race does not stop at the admissions office. This trend has hardly abated with time, and today, such programs are commonplace. See Brief for Gail Heriot et al. Wood, Neo-Segregation at Yale 16—17 ; see also D.

Meanwhile, these discriminatory policies risk creating new prejudices and allowing old ones to fester. Petitioner here clearly demonstrates this fact. Applicants denied admission to certain colleges may come to believe—accurately or not—that their race was responsible for their failure to attain a life-long dream.

These individuals, and others who wished for their success, may resent members of what they perceive to be favored races, believing that the successes of those individuals are unearned. What, then, would be the endpoint of these affirmative action policies. Not racial harmony, integration, or equality under the law. Rather, these policies appear to be leading to a world in which everyone is defined by their skin color, demanding ever-increasing entitlements and preferences on that basis.

Not only is that exactly the kind of factionalism that the Constitution was meant to safeguard against, see The Federalist No. Madison , but it is a factionalism based on ever-shifting sands. That is because race is a social construct; we may each identify as members of particular races for any number of reasons, having to do with our skin color, our heritage, or our cultural identity.

And, over time, these ephemeral, socially constructed categories have often shifted. For example, whereas universities today would group all white applicants together, white elites previously sought to exclude Jews and other white immigrant groups from higher education. In fact, it is impossible to look at an individual and know definitively his or her race; some who would consider themselves black, for example, may be quite fair skinned.

Yet, university admissions policies ask individuals to identify themselves as belonging to one of only a few reductionist racial groups. Someone from the Philippines. See post , at 5—7 Gorsuch, J. Whichever choice he makes in the event he chooses to report a race at all , the form silos him into an artificial category.

Worse, it sends a clear signal that the category matters. But, under our Constitution, race is irrelevant, as the Court acknowledges. Of course, that is false. Members of the same race do not all share the exact same experiences and viewpoints; far from it.

A black person from rural Alabama surely has different experiences than a black person from Manhattan or a black first-generation immigrant from Nigeria, in the same way that a white person from rural Vermont has a different perspective than a white person from Houston, Texas. That is the same naked racism upon which segregation itself was built.

Small wonder, then, that these policies are leading to increasing racial polarization and friction. Rather than forming a more pluralistic society, these policies thus strip us of our individuality and undermine the very diversity of thought that universities purport to seek. Racialism simply cannot be undone by different or more racialism.

Instead, the solution announced in the second founding is incorporated in our Constitution: that we are all equal, and should be treated equally before the law without regard to our race. Only that promise can allow us to look past our differing skin colors and identities and see each other for what we truly are: individuals with unique thoughts, perspectives, and goals, but with equal dignity and equal rights under the law.

B Justice Jackson has a different view. Rather than focusing on individuals as individuals, her dissent focuses on the historical subjugation of black Americans, invoking statistical racial gaps to argue in favor of defining and categorizing individuals by their race. As she sees things, we are all inexorably trapped in a fundamentally racist society, with the original sin of slavery and the historical subjugation of black Americans still determining our lives today.

Post , at 1—26 dissenting opinion. I strongly disagree. First, as stated above, any statistical gaps between the average wealth of black and white Americans is constitutionally irrelevant. I, of course, agree that our society is not, and has never been, colorblind. Post , at 2 Jackson, J. People discriminate against one another for a whole host of reasons.

Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.

With the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the people of our Nation proclaimed that the law may not sort citizens based on race. It is this principle that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment adopted in the wake of the Civil War to fulfill the promise of equality under the law.

And it is this principle that has guaranteed a Nation of equal citizens the privileges or immunities of citizenship and the equal protection of the laws. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address Post , at 24— This is so, she writes, because of statistical disparities among different racial groups. See post , at 11— Even if some whites have a lower household net worth than some blacks, what matters to Justice Jackson is that the average white household has more wealth than the average black household.

This lore is not and has never been true. Even in the segregated South where I grew up, individuals were not the sum of their skin color. Then as now, not all disparities are based on race; not all people are racist; and not all differences between individuals are ascribable to race. Sowell, Wealth, Poverty and Politics Worse still, Justice Jackson uses her broad observations about statistical relationships between race and select measures of health, wealth, and well-being to label all blacks as victims.

Her desire to do so is unfathomable to me. I cannot deny the great accomplishments of black Americans, including those who succeeded despite long odds. Of course, none of those statistics are capable of drawing a direct causal link between race—rather than socioeconomic status or any other factor—and individual outcomes.

So Justice Jackson supplies the link herself: the legacy of slavery and the nature of inherited wealth. This, she claims, locks blacks into a seemingly perpetual inferior caste. Such a view is irrational; it is an insult to individual achievement and cancerous to young minds seeking to push through barriers, rather than consign themselves to permanent victimhood. If an applicant has less financial means because of generational inheritance or otherwise , then surely a university may take that into account.

If an applicant has medical struggles or a family member with medical concerns, a university may consider that too. Individuals are the sum of their unique experiences, challenges, and accomplishments. What matters is not the barriers they face, but how they choose to confront them. And their race is not to blame for everything—good or bad—that happens in their lives.

Make no mistake: Her dissent is not a vanguard of the innocent and helpless. Post , at 26; see also post , at 5—7 Gorsuch, J. Post , at 26 opinion of Jackson, J. Social movements that invoke these sorts of rallying cries, historically, have ended disastrously. Unsurprisingly, this tried-and-failed system defies both law and reason.

Start with the obvious: If social reorganization in the name of equality may be justified by the mere fact of statistical disparities among racial groups, then that reorganization must continue until these disparities are fully eliminated, regardless of the reasons for the disparities and the cost of their elimination.

If blacks fail a test at higher rates than their white counterparts regardless of whether the reason for the disparity has anything at all to do with race , the only solution will be race-focused measures. If those measures were to result in blacks failing at yet higher rates, the only solution would be to double down. In fact, there would seem to be no logical limit to what the government may do to level the racial playing field—outright wealth transfers, quota systems, and racial preferences would all seem permissible.

In such a system, it would not matter how many innocents suffer race-based injuries; all that would matter is reaching the race-based goal. Worse, the classifications that Justice Jackson draws are themselves race-based stereotypes. John is a white, seventh-generation legacy at the school, while James is black and would be the first in his family to attend UNC. Post , at 3. Justice Jackson argues that race-conscious admission programs are necessary to adequately compare the two applicants.

But, setting that aside, why is it that John should be judged based on the actions of his great-great-great-grandparents. And what would Justice Jackson say to John when deeming him not as worthy of admission: Some statistically significant number of white people had advantages in college admissions seven generations ago, and you have inherited their incurable sin. Nor should we accept that John or James represent all members of their respective races.

All racial groups are heterogeneous, and blacks are no exception—encompassing northerners and southerners, rich and poor, and recent immigrants and descendants of slaves. Eschewing the complexity that comes with individuality may make for an uncomplicated narrative, but lumping people together and judging them based on assumed inherited or ancestral traits is nothing but stereotyping.

Consider Jack, a black applicant and the son of a multimillionaire industrialist. And what about members of the numerous other racial and ethnic groups in our Nation. What about Anne, the child of Chinese immigrants. Jacob, the grandchild of Holocaust survivors who escaped to this Nation with nothing and faced discrimination upon arrival?

Or Thomas, the great- grandchild of Irish immigrants escaping famine. While articulating her black and white world literally , Justice Jackson ignores the experiences of other immigrant groups like Asians, see supra , at 43—44 and white communities that have faced historic barriers. Indeed, Justice Jackson seems to have no response—no explanation at all—for the people who will shoulder that burden.

How, for example, would Justice Jackson explain the need for race-based preferences to the Chinese student who has worked hard his whole life, only to be denied college admission in part because of his skin color. History has taught us to abhor theories that call for elites to pick racial winners and losers in the name of sociological experimentation.

Nor is it clear what another few generations of race- conscious college admissions may be expected to accomplish. Even today, affirmative action programs that offer an admissions boost to black and Hispanic students discriminate against those who identify themselves as members of other races that do not receive such preferential treatment.

Must others in the future make sacrifices to re-level the playing field for this new phase of racial subordination. And then, out of whose lives should the debt owed to those further victims be repaid. This vision of meeting social racism with government-imposed racism is thus self-defeating, resulting in a never-ending cycle of victimization.

There is no reason to continue down that path. To start, universities prohibited from engaging in racial discrimination by state law continue to enroll racially diverse classes by race-neutral means. Times, July 20, , p. Race-neutral policies may thus achieve the same benefits of racial harmony and equality without any of the burdens and strife generated by affirmative action policies.

In fact, meritocratic systems have long refuted bigoted misperceptions of what black students can accomplish. Meritocratic systems, with objective grading scales, are critical to that belief. Such scales have always been a great equalizer—offering a metric for achievement that bigotry could not alter.

Racial preferences take away this benefit, eliminating the very metric by which those who have the most to prove can clearly demonstrate their accomplishments—both to themselves and to others. Historically Black Colleges and Universities HBCUs do not have a large amount of racial diversity, but they demonstrate a marked ability to improve the lives of their students.

Science Foundation Sept. Hammond, L. In fact, Xavier University, an HBCU with only a small percentage of white students, has had better success at helping its low-income students move into the middle class than Harvard has. See Hammond 14; see also Brief for Oklahoma et al.

And, each of the top 10 HBCUs have a success rate above the national average. Hammond Not for the betterment of those black students, it would seem. And, because race-conscious college admissions are plainly not necessary to serve even the interests of blacks, there is no justification to compel such programs more broadly. See Parents Involved , U. And, the tragic failure of this Court was its misinterpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments, as Justice Harlan predicted in Plessy.

We should not repeat this mistake merely because we think, as our predecessors thought, that the present arrangements are superior to the Constitution. In short, they are plainly—and boldly—unconstitutional. See Brown II , U. While I am painfully aware of the social and economic ravages which have befallen my race and all who suffer discrimination, I hold out enduring hope that this country will live up to its principles so clearly enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States: that all men are created equal, are equal citizens, and must be treated equally before the law.

Notes 1 In fact, Indians would not be considered citizens until several decades later. Indian Citizenship Act of , ch. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. Notably, those four interpretations are all colorblind. But, evidence suggests that, at the relevant time, Berea conducted its admissions without distinction by race.

See Gratz v. As Justice Gorsuch points out, the language of Title VI makes no allowance for racial considerations in university admissions. See post , at 2—3 concurring opinion. Though I continue to adhere to my view in Bostock v. Clayton County , U. Commager, Documents of American History 9th ed. And upon this ground our Constitution of Government.

Statement in Briggs v. Elliott , O. Statement in Davis v. X remarks of Judge Motley. And, of course, if universities wish to refute the mismatch theory, they need only release the data necessary to test its accuracy. See post , at 58— This simply defies mathematics.

In a zero-sum game like college admissions, any sorting mechanism that takes race into account in any way, see post , at 27 opinion of Jackson, J. And, the universities here admit that race is determinative in at least some of their admissions decisions. See ante , at 24—25; post , at 5—7 opinion of Gorsuch, J. Universities may not, however, assume that all members of certain racial minorities are disadvantaged.

Sowell, Education: Assumptions Versus History 7—38 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Known for its academics, the school attracted black students from across the Washington, D. Dunbar produced the first black General in the U. When the D. For many students, an acceptance letter from Harvard or the University of North Carolina is a ticket to a brighter future.

Tens of thousands of applicants compete for a small number of coveted spots. For some time, both universities have decided which applicants to admit or reject based in part on race. The message for these cases is unmistakable. That law applies to both institutions, as they elect to receive millions of dollars of federal assistance annually.

And the trial records reveal that both schools routinely discriminate on the basis of race when choosing new students—exactly what the law forbids. Sandoval , U. From this, we can safely say that Title VI forbids a recipient of federal funds from intentionally treating one person worse than another similarly situated person on the ground of race, color, or national origin.

Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar , U. Bostock , U. Now put these pieces back together and a clear rule emerges. Title VI prohibits a recipient of federal funds from intentionally treating one person worse than another similarly situated person because of his race, color, or national origin. Johnson Controls, Inc. Title VI prohibits a recipient of federal funds from intentionally treating any individual worse even in part because of his race, color, or national origin and without regard to any other reason or motive the recipient might assert.

Without question, Congress in could have taken the law in various directions. But to safeguard the civil rights of all Americans, Congress chose a simple and profound rule. One holding that a recipient of federal funds may never discriminate based on race, color, or national origin—period. If this exposition of Title VI sounds familiar, it should. Appreciating the breadth of this provision, just three years ago this Court read its essentially identical terms the same way.

See Bostock , U. Alvarez , U. B Applying Title VI to the cases now before us, the result is plain. No one questions that both institutions consult race when making their admissions decisions. And no one can doubt that both schools intentionally treat some applicants worse than others at least in part because of their race. Like many colleges and universities, those schools invite interested students to complete the Common Application.

Applicants can write in further details if they choose. Where do these boxes come from. A federal interagency commission devised this scheme of classifications in the s to facilitate data collection. Waters eds. These classifications rest on incoherent stereotypes. It sweeps into one pile East Asians e.

Bernstein Amicus Brief 2, 5. And even that category contains its curiosities. The remaining classifications depend just as much on irrational stereotypes. See Bernstein Amicus Brief 10— It embraces an Iraqi or Ukrainian refugee as much as a member of the British royal family. If anything, attempts to divide us all up into a handful of groups have become only more incoherent with time.

American families have become increasingly multicultural, a fact that has led to unseemly disputes about whether someone is really a member of a certain racial or ethnic group. There are decisions denying Hispanic status to someone of Italian-Argentine descent, Marinelli Constr. New York , App. Erie County , App. Given all this, is it any surprise that members of certain groups sometimes try to conceal their race or ethnicity?

Or that a cottage industry has sprung up to help college applicants do so. Brief for Asian American Coalition for Education et al. Paid advisors, in turn, tell high school students of Asian descent to downplay their heritage to maximize their odds of admission. And it is hard not to wonder whether those left paying the steepest price are those least able to afford it—children of families with no chance of hiring the kind of consultants who know how to play this game.

Consider how this plays out at Harvard. Admissions officers read each application and rate students across several categories: academic, extracurricular, athletic, school support, personal, and overall. The next step in the process is committee review. So, too, may the full admissions committee. There are clear losers too.

Things work similarly at UNC. In a typical year, about 44, applicants vie for 4, spots. Admissions officers read each application and rate prospective students along eight dimensions: academic programming, academic performance, standardized tests, extracurriculars, special talents, essays, background, and personal.

The decisions become truly final only after a committee approves or rejects them. Nor is this an accident. Ante, at The racial composition of each incoming class remained steady over that time—remarkably so. Perhaps—at least assuming the applicant pool looks much the same each year and the school rather mechanically admits applicants based on objective criteria.

C Throughout this litigation, the parties have spent less time contesting these facts than debating other matters. For example, the parties debate how much of a role race plays in admissions at Harvard and UNC. SFFA responds with trial evidence showing that, whatever label the universities use to describe their processes, they intentionally consult race and, by design, their race-based tips and plusses benefit applicants of certain groups to the detriment of others.

See Brief for Petitioner 20—35, 40— The parties also debate the reasons both schools consult race. Brief for Petitioner 12—14, 25— For its part, Harvard expresses regret for its past practices while denying that they resemble its current ones. And both schools insist that their student bodies would lack sufficient diversity without race-conscious admissions.

When it comes to defining and measuring diversity, the parties spar too. SFFA observes that the racial categories the universities employ in the name of diversity do not begin to reflect the differences that exist within each group. See Part I—B—1, supra.

Even putting all that aside, SFFA stresses that neither Harvard nor UNC is willing to quantify how much racial and ethnic diversity they think sufficient. And, SFFA contends, the universities may not wish to do so because their stated goal implies a desire to admit some fixed number or quota of students from each racial group.

See Brief for Petitioner 77, 80; Tr. Besides, SFFA asks, if it is diversity the schools are after, why do they exhibit so little interest in other non-racial markers of it. See Brief for Petitioner 78, 83— SFFA contends that both Harvard and UNC could obtain significant racial diversity without resorting to race-based admissions practices.

Many other universities across the country, SFFA points out, have sought to do just that by reducing legacy preferences, increasing financial aid, and the like. Brief for Petitioner 85—86; see also Brief for Oklahoma et al. Brief for Petitioner 33—34, 81; see 2 App.

Doing these two things would barely affect the academic credentials of each incoming class. Brief for Petitioner 33— And it would not require Harvard to end tips for recruited athletes, who as a group are much weaker academically than non-athletes.

While race-neutral on their face, too, these preferences undoubtedly benefit white and wealthy applicants the most. Still, Harvard stands by them. Just how many admissions decisions turn on race. Fortunately, Title VI does not require an answer to any of these questions. It does not ask how much a recipient of federal funds discriminates.

Instead, the law prohibits covered institutions from intentionally treating any individual worse even in part because of race. So yes, of course, the universities consider many non-racial factors in their admissions processes too. And perhaps they mean well when they favor certain candidates over others based on the color of their skin.

But even if all that is true, their conduct violates Title VI just the same. D The principal dissent contends that this understanding of Title VI is contrary to precedent. Post , at 26—27, n. That raises two questions: Do the dissenters think Bostock wrongly decided. Or do they read the same words in neighboring provisions of the same statute—enacted at the same time by the same Congress—to mean different things?

Apparently, the federal government takes the latter view. Respectfully, I do not see it. The words of the Civil Rights Act of are not like mood rings; they do not change their message from one moment to the next. Rather than engage with the statutory text or our precedent in Bostock , the principal dissent seeks to sow confusion about the facts.

Post , at 32, n. But the question in these cases is not who could hypothetically receive a race-based tip. It is who actually receives one. And on that score the lower courts left no doubt. See supra, at 12— See supra, at 8—12, 16— Put to the side telling evidence that came out in discovery. Consider just the dissents in these cases.

Post, at 12, 68 opinion of Sotomayor, J. Plainly, Harvard and UNC choose to treat some students worse than others in part because of race. To suggest otherwise—or to cling to the fact that the schools do not always say the quiet part aloud—is to deny reality. We have seen, too, that Harvard and UNC do just what the law forbids.

One might wonder, then, why the parties have devoted years and fortunes litigating other matters, like how much the universities discriminate and why they do so. The answer lies in Bakke. A Bakke concerned admissions to the medical school at the University of California, Davis.

That school set aside a certain number of spots in each class for minority applicants. The Court agreed with Mr. At the same time, however, a different coalition of five Justices ventured beyond the facts of the case to suggest that, in other circumstances not at issue, universities may sometimes permissibly use race in their admissions processes.

See ante , at 16—19 opinion for the Court. As important as these conclusions were some of the interpretive moves made along the way. Put differently, they read Title VI to prohibit recipients of federal funds from doing whatever the Equal Protection Clause prohibits States from doing.

Justice Powell and Justice Brennan then proceeded to evaluate racial preferences in higher education directly under the Equal Protection Clause. From there, however, their paths diverged. Justice Powell thought some racial preferences might be permissible but that the admissions program at issue violated the promise of equal protection. Justice Brennan would have given a wider berth to racial preferences and allowed the challenged program to proceed.

Justice Stevens also writing for himself and three others took an altogether different approach. The University also acknowledges that it was, and still is, receiving federal financial assistance. As a result, for over four decades, every case about racial preferences in school admissions under Title VI has turned into a case about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

And what a confused body of constitutional law followed. Within higher education, however, an entirely distinct set of rules emerged. Not all schools, though—elementary and secondary schools apparently do not qualify for this deference. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Fisher , U. If you cannot follow all these twists and turns, you are not alone.

Recognizing as much, the Court today cuts through the kudzu. B If Bakke led to errors in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, its first mistake was to take us there. That law deserves our respect and its terms provide us with all the direction we need. Put the two provisions side by side. That such differently worded provisions should mean the same thing is implausible on its face.

Consider just some of the obvious differences. The Equal Protection Clause operates on States. It does not purport to regulate the conduct of private parties. By contrast, Title VI applies to recipients of federal funds—covering not just many state actors, but many private actors too. In other respects, however, the relative scope of the two provisions is inverted.

The Equal Protection Clause addresses all manner of distinctions between persons and this Court has held that it implies different degrees of judicial scrutiny for different kinds of classifications. So, for example, courts apply strict scrutiny for classifications based on race, color, and national origin; intermediate scrutiny for classifications based on sex; and rational-basis review for classifications based on more prosaic grounds.

Garrett , U. By contrast, Title VI targets only certain classifications—those based on race, color, or national origin. And that law does not direct courts to subject these classifications to one degree of scrutiny or another. Instead, as we have seen, its rule is as uncomplicated as it is momentous.

Under Title VI, it is always unlawful to discriminate among persons even in part because of race, color, or national origin. Along the way, as Justice Stevens documented, both opinions did more than a little cherry-picking from the legislative record. The moves made in Bakke were not statutory interpretation. They were judicial improvisation.

Under our Constitution, judges have never been entitled to disregard the plain terms of a valid congressional enactment based on surmise about unenacted legislative intentions. Ramsdell , U. Moore , U. Today, the Court corrects course in its reading of the Equal Protection Clause. With that, courts should now also correct course in their treatment of Title VI.

For years, they have read a solo opinion in Bakke like a statute while reading Title VI as a mere suggestion. A proper respect for the law demands the opposite.